meaning, the jury are instructed to consider first the use of the term 'fish oil' in commercial transactions and second the general use of the term 'fish'.
The first approach is advocated by Judd's lawyers: after all, it is the merchants whom the statute directly affects, and fraud amongst whom had prompted its drafting. So conceived, the issue clearly has 'nothing to do with whether whales were fish' (Burnett 2007: 149) . As Judd's attorney argues in closing:
Should you [the jury] decide that a whale is, in common acceptation of the community, considered to be a fish, there remains still a very important question, on the just decision of which the defendant will, I think, be entitled to your verdict. Is whale oil bought and sold and consumed under the appellation of fish oil? (Sampson 1819: 53) The answer appears to be straight-forwardly, 'No'. According to the 'taxonomy of the market' (Burnett 2007: 150) , whale oil would never be labelled 'fish oil' -the two, according to one merchant, being as different as molasses and sugar (147f.). From this perspective, the jury does get things wrong. But their verdict -most likely motivated by local political prejudice (174ff.) -raises no philosophical difficulties. They simply fail to appreciate which community matters in ascertaining the statute's intended meaning.
The second approach to the statute's intended meaning looks to the general use of 'fish'. According to common usage at the time, whales count as 'fish' (Burnett 2007: especially Ch. 2) . According to nascent zoological usage, they do not. The issue for the jury is not then to say whether whales are fish, but to ascertain which usage of 'fish' is germane to the statute's intended meaning. Maurice's lawyer ridicules naturalism (2007: 9, 192) . But his more basic contention is that the zoological sense of 'fish' (even if innocuous) is not that intended by the statute: 'Statutes being enacted to regulate the conduct of the whole community, the words of the statute are to be interpreted according to their common usage and acceptation' (Sampson 1819: 60, my emphasis) .
Philosophical discussions of the period echo these points. (See further Burnett 2007: 215ff, Dupré 1999 and Khalidi 2014.) Mill in his important discussion of classification writes, 'Whales are or are not fish, according to the purpose for which we are considering them ' (1843: vol. II, 305) . He approvingly cites Whewell whose view is so pertinent that Burnett (216) conjectures he has Maurice v. Judd in mind.
If we are speaking of the internal structure and physiology of the [whale], we must not call them fish; for in these respects they deviate widely from the fishes. . . . But this would not prevent our speaking of the whale-fishery, and calling such animals fish on all occasion connected with this employment; for the relations thus arising depend upon the animal's living in the water, and being caught in a manner similar to other fishes. A plea that human laws which mention fish do not apply to whales, would be rejected at once by an intelligent judge. (1840: vol. I, lxxv)
Whewell thus echoes the sentiment of Maurice's lawyer. If we agree, we should endorse the jury's verdict.
Maurice v. Judd is far from unique in having such issues at its heart. Consider Nix v. Hedden 149 U.S. 304 (1893) which concerns the action of tomato merchants (Nix et al.) seeking to recover back duties from a dutycollector (Hedden) on the grounds that tomatoes are not duty-incurring vegetables but duty-free fruit. The Supreme Court finds in favour of Hedden. It does not thereby reveal its ignorance of the true nature of tomatoes. As Justice Gray makes clear in his opinion:
Botanically speaking, tomatoes are the fruit of a vine, just as are cucumbers, squashes, beans and peas. But in the common language of the people, whether sellers or consumers of provisions, all these are vegetables, which are grown in kitchen gardens, and which, whether eaten cooked or raw, are, like potatoes, carrots, parsnips, turnips, beets, cauliflower, cabbage, celery and lettuce, usually served at dinner in, with or after the soup, fish or meats which constitute the principal part of the repast, and not, like fruits generally, as dessert.
1
The court's determination thus reflects its view that the relevant tariff act intended 'vegetable' in its common language or culinary sense.
2 The issue is not whether tomatoes are fruit or vegetables.
Analogously, Maurice v. Judd does not concern whether whales are fish. The substantive disagreement concerns the intended meaning of 'fish oil' in statute. Given the financial stakes for traders and duty-collectors, this 'merely verbal' dispute has considerable substance. Moreover, as Burnett wonderfully brings out, the courtroom drama is an uncommonly fishy business. However, its resolution requires carefully drafted statutes, not carefully crafted metasemantic principles. 3, 4 St. Anne's College, Oxford OX2 6HS, UK ian.phillips@st-annes.ox.ac.uk
